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Abstract
Policy makers, academics, and conservationists often posit that poor coordination between dif-
ferent land use sectors, and between levels of governance, is an underlying challenge for reducing
deforestation and forest degradation. This paper analyzes this argument using data from inter-
views with over 500 respondents from government, nongovernmental organizations, private
companies, local and indigenous communities, activists, and individuals involved in 35 diverse
land use initiatives in three countries: Peru, Indonesia, and Mexico. We find that while there is
strong evidence of widespread coordination failures between sectors and levels, more funda-
mental political issues preclude effective coordination. We argue that political coalitions act to
oppose environmental objectives and to impede their opponents from participating in land use
governance. Moreover, we find that where coordination between actors does occur, it does not
necessarily produce environmentally sustainable and socially just land use outcomes. Where we
do find successful initiatives to reduce deforestation and benefit local people, effective
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coordination between well-informed actors is often present, but it does not occur spontaneously,
and is instead driven by political organizing over time by activists, local people, nongovernmental
organizations, and international donors. We suggest that the global environmental community
must recognize explicitly these political dimensions of land use governance in order to success-
fully collaborate with local people to reduce deforestation.
Keywords
Integrative Governance, intersectoral coordination, land use politics, deforestation, political
ecology
Introduction
As advocates for conservation struggle to reduce global deforestation and associated threats
to human well-being, biodiversity, and the Earth’s climate system, a consensus seems to
emerge: the failure of sectors, such as mining, forestry, environment, and agriculture to
“coordinate” with each other, is a major barrier to sustainable and equitable land use.
This view has been expressed in international forums like the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties (UNFCCC COP) (Becerra, n.d.;
Egal, n.d.; Gregorio et al., 2013), the Global Landscapes Forum that has taken place along-
side it since 2013 (Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 2015; Freeman
et al., 2015; Rantala et al., 2014; Ros-Tonen et al., 2014), and also in national and subna-
tional policy (Brockhaus et al., 2014; Gallemore et al., 2014; Kowler et al., 2014; Ravikumar
et al., 2015b). Researchers and policy advocates have pressed for more intersectoral coor-
dination around land use planning in general, and as a key element of the international
deforestation reduction scheme REDDþ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
forest Degradation) in particular.
Lack of coordination between sectors, the argument goes, leads government ministries
to work at cross-purposes rather than collaborate. Agricultural and mining offices pro-
mote extraction and investment activities that lead to deforestation, while forestry and
environmental offices struggle to keep natural resources intact for sustainable produc-
tion, conservation, and climate change mitigation. If sectors that have historically
worked at odds with, or at least in isolation from, one another were to finally coordi-
nate—that is, deliberate, negotiate and plan—they could achieve equitable low-
emissions development. This logic is increasingly applied at multiple levels, as coordi-
nation issues have been emphasized not only in national but also in sub-national and
even international arenas.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the Integrative Governance (IG) literature
(see Visseren-Hamakers, 2018a, 2018b) by taking a critical look at this emerging conven-
tional wisdom, and to examine the degree to which “coordination” across multiple sectors
and levels determines land use change outcomes. IG is defined as the theories and practices
that focus on the relationships between governance instruments and/or systems (Visseren-
Hamakers, 2015). We contribute to the IG literature by examining why the relationships
between the environmental governance system and governance systems for other sectors
(e.g., agriculture, mining) are the way they are. We aim to explain these relationships,
something that has not been done very often in the IG literature so far (see Visseren-
Hamakers, 2015).
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We use data from interviews with hundreds of respondents from multiple sectoral offices
of national and subnational governments, environmental nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), private companies, local and indigenous communities, activists, and individuals
involved in 34 diverse land use initiatives in three countries: Peru, Indonesia, and Mexico.
Interviews elucidated multilevel and multi-sector assemblages of actors that drive land use
decision making, by exploring decision processes, their legitimacy, and actors’ relative
power and influence.
While respondents commonly reported lack of coordination related to land use, we argue
that a deeper analysis of the political dynamics reveals that “lack of coordination” is not by
and large the underlying barrier to equitable and sustainable land use: rather, coalitions of
actors who stand to gain from deforestation wield political power to systematically exclude
coalitions for conservation and community land rights. Thus, the widespread “lack of
coordination” discourse is problematic because it obfuscates historical and ongoing political
contestations, suggesting that all stakeholders desire the same ends and could achieve them
if they would merely come together to “coordinate” around these shared objectives. Our
results suggest, rather, that there are distinct coalitions with genuinely divergent ideas about
conservation and development, and mutually incompatible land use objectives.
We argue that the underlying factor that attenuates the influence of coalitions for envi-
ronmental sustainability and local peoples’ rights is that opposing political coalitions active-
ly subvert them. Moreover, we find that where coordination between actors does occur, it
does not necessarily produce environmentally sustainable and socially just land use out-
comes. In fact, coordination among actors such as agricultural and mining offices, private
firms and elites with special interests is often instrumental in bringing about deforestation
and its attendant social and environmental harms. On the other hand, where we do find
successful initiatives to reduce deforestation and benefit local people, effective coordination
between well-informed actors is often present, but it does not occur spontaneously, and is
instead driven by political organizing over time by activists, local people, NGOs, and inter-
national donors. Furthermore, there are at least some cases in which conservation interests
work strategically with government offices to protect forests and stop deforestation, but
without local peoples’ participation (see also Brockington et al., 2008). Thus, coordination
may or may not result in decisions that local actors consider legitimate, even when those
decisions support conservation.
We suggest that the global environmental community must recognize explicitly these polit-
ical dimensions of land use governance in order to effectively engage with coalitions for
transformative change that reduce deforestation (see also Myers et al., 2018). We begin by
briefly discussing key literature on multilevel and multi-sector governance, highlighting
research on how coalitions interact, through collaboration and through more adversarial
contestation. Then, after describing the study methods, we present key evidence from the
comparative case study of land use change across the three countries. We conclude with a
discussion of these findings in the context of emerging low-emissions development policies
and international discourses, and especially the much discussed “landscape approach.”
The politics of landscape governance
Research on advocacy coalitions, landscape governance, polycentric governance, and polit-
ical ecology addresses the relationship between coordination among actors and land use
change. We use the term Integrative Governance (Visseren-Hamakers, 2015) to describe the
intersection of some of this scholarship. IG studies not only provide room to examine the
details of who makes decisions and how decisions are made, but also emphasize how
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different actors operating at different levels and across sectors exercise power to achieve
their objectives (see, e.g., Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Larson,
2005; Ribot, 2002). In this section, we show how this literature provides tools for analyzing
the politics of land use across levels and sectors, and highlight a tendency to focus on
coordination problems. At the same time, we suggest that the literature does not adequately
explain the reasons behind these coordination failures, and as a result does not adequately
present political solutions.
In principle, effective coordination between actors can be very useful for reducing defor-
estation and forest degradation. It is commonly understood that the drivers of deforestation
often originate outside of the forestry sector. This means that some kind of cross-sectoral
coordination is required to address it, and when this has occurred effectively, the results
have been notable. For example, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon declined 70% from
2005 to 2013 at least in part due to the joint action of an interministerial working group
(May et al., 2016; Nepstad et al., 2014). But such success is not common, and there has been
a backlash in Brazil.
Although many fields of study go beyond de jure relationships between state agencies and
non-state actors, the emphasis on the fundamentally political nature of land and natural
resource decision-making emerges most directly from literature influenced by political ecol-
ogy (Larson et al., 2013; Peluso and Lund, 2011; Ravikumar et al., 2015b; Ribot et al.,
2010). Whether governance is legally centralized or decentralized, the politics of land use can
be fraught with conflict (Palmer, 2011; Ravikumar et al., 2013; Yasmi et al., 2006), and
differences are settled through contestation among actors with different interests
(Ferguson, 1990).
The literature on policy advocacy coalitions suggests that there are multiple ways in
which different actors come together to interact. Weible et al. (2009) contrast adversarial
and collaborative policy systems. They posit that adversarial systems are characterized by
highly competitive coalitions with polarized beliefs, minimal coordination, disparate access
to authorities (with some government agencies strongly favoring some coalitions over
others), and extensive venue shopping by actors who look for favorable partnerships to
achieve their objectives to the exclusion of others. Conversely, collaborative systems involve
coalitions with at least some shared or convergent beliefs, some coordination among coa-
litions, shared access to decision-making authorities without strong favoritism, and an
emphasis on achieving “win–win” solutions through compromise. Barnes et al. (2016)
argue that advocacy coalitions deploy diverse strategies depending on the political con-
straints that they encounter, finding for example that civil society coalitions organized
around the forestry sector in India deployed both adversarial and collaborative strategies.
While the advocacy coalition literature often defines coalitions in terms of groups with
shared beliefs (Barnes et al., 2016; Kumar, 2014; Schlager, 1995; Scholz and Pinney, 1995;
Weible and Sabatier, 2006; Weible et al., 2009), Arts and Buizer (2009) argue that coalitions
are not so much formed around shared beliefs—which are properties of individuals or
organizations—but are instead shaped by discourses, which are external to actors. In a
post-structuralist conceptualization of coalition building, then, coalitions are presumed to
form not only around fixed beliefs, or even economic interests (Quaglia, 2010), but also by
continuously shifting ideas about policy. In other words, governments, NGOs, and even
indigenous organizations do not just have material interests; they have ideologies. These
ideologies can be “neoliberal,” favoring market and privatization-oriented solutions to envi-
ronmental issues, poverty, and even more obviously political problems, like how to allocate
land rights. Conversely, “rights-based” ideologies can serve to bring together communities,
producer organizations, and environmental NGOs.
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Rudel (2007) identifies the limits of collaborative governance as a means for achieving
conservation and social justice objectives. He argues that government policy constrains or
magnifies the influence of these coalitions that seek to benefit from deforestation. For Rudel,
growth coalitions broadly refer to highly capitalized development actors. He contrasts
growth coalitions with smaller farmers, laborers, and others who benefit less, or less directly,
from conventional economic growth. Rudel argues that contestations between these groups
shape land use and socioeconomic outcomes.
Thus, literature from multiple disciplines highlights the role of power and political con-
testation in forming coalitions for action—stable or ephemeral, adversarial or collaborative.
At the same time, literature on polycentric and multilevel governance emphasizes that these
coalitions and looser constellations of actors operate at multiple levels and across sectors,
including private firms, governments, individuals, and nonprofits. A newer and highly influ-
ential literature and associated policy discourse, on integrated “landscape approaches,”
though, appears to address these issues of power much less explicitly.
Sayer et al. (2013) set out 10 principles for landscape approaches. Taken together, these
principles advance multi-stakeholder dialogue coordination among actors from local to
national levels, and strong mechanisms for transparency. These are laudable goals: all
else equal, transparent decision processes are more democratic, fairer, and more inclusive.
If representatives of different sectors are negotiating in good faith, then more and more
transparent dialogue is surely a good thing. What is missing from this analysis, though, is an
acknowledgment that different actors are also committed to their own agendas.
Nonetheless, in a review of cases, Reed et al. (2016) find that bringing multiple sectors—
like agriculture and environment—into dialogue is a predominant feature of land-
scape approaches.
Milder et al. (2012) suggest that multi-sector approaches can help to resolve structural
poverty, and also call out single-sector approaches as historically problematic. Other
studies echo their reproach of sectors operating in silos, calling for more social learning,
data sharing, and indigenous representation (e.g., Bebbington et al., 2008; Berkes, 2009;
Echeverri Perico and Pilar Ribero, 2002). Estrada-Carmona et al. (2014) advance a
similar argument based on a broad empirical study, surveying over 100 “integrated
landscape initiatives” across 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries. They find
that more multi-sectoral coordination likely did improve outcomes, but lament the
absence of “powerful” stakeholders, including private firms, in multi-stakeholder dia-
logues. Their analysis does not consider that coordinating with such actors might be
unhelpful or compromising for conservation and environmental justice concerns, nor
why these more powerful players did not come to the table. Bastos-Lima et al. (2017)
also found that landscape approaches enable coordination among actors within the
environmental community, but not between the environmental community and
other sectors.
Thus, there is a tension between the political ecology and coalition literature, which
emphasizes power and contestation as determinants of land use outcomes, and much of the
literature on multilevel governance and “landscape approaches,” which sees coordination
and dialogue as solutions. In the context of land use or REDDþ, how coalitions work,
whether adversarial or collaborative, remains poorly understood. Indeed, much of the dis-
course around landscape approaches fails to differentiate between these modes of engage-
ment, instead assuming that mere coordination is paramount. The purpose of this research is
to go beyond examining whether different actors coordinate to interrogate who coordinates
with whom and why and with what results.
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Methods
In order to answer these questions, we deployed grounded qualitative research to analyze
the politics of land use, including who worked with whom and how, and who ultimately held
power in decisions about land use. The approach is described more completely in
Ravikumar et al. (2015a) and was influenced by Saito-Jensen (2015). We utilized a global
nested comparative case study approach involving research in three countries: Peru,
Indonesia, and Mexico.1
In each country, we first used secondary data to identify two or three subnational juris-
dictions or regions that had tropical forests and multiple REDDþ initiatives, contrasting
governance regimes, and a variety of types of land use changes. In each subnational region,
we selected approximately five sites of land use change to include, to the extent possible:
1. significant land use or land use management changes within the last 20 years;
2. at least two sites with activities associated with broader regional deforestation and deg-
radation drivers (sites with initiatives leading to more deforestation in Table 1); and
3. at least two with initiatives aimed at conservation, sustainable forest management, refor-
estation, or other activities likely to reduce deforestation or forest degradation, with a
particular emphasis on REDDþ (low-emissions initiative sites in Table 1).
To identify sites, we conducted interviews with key informants, generally in regional
capitals, to understand the major drivers of deforestation and degradation, and also the
major activities aiming to restore, conserve, or sustainably manage forests (see Table 1).
In total, we selected 34 distinct sites of land use change. At each site, we aimed to identify
the range of actors with an interest in, or influence over, the land use change. We aimed to
interview: respondents from all levels and sectoral offices of government that were likely
involved, including agricultural, environmental, forestry, and mining offices; NGOs and
private firms who promoted the land use change or had an interest in it; local communities
driving, affected by, or involved in the change; researchers, activists, and key individuals
with expert knowledge or unique perspectives.
We interviewed 8–20 informants at each site, as well as at the regional level, for a total of
576 interviews (149 in Indonesia, 275 in Peru, and 152 in Mexico) conducted between late
2013 and mid-2015. The semi-structured interviews explored the history of land use, the
decision-making process that led to land use changes, relations among relevant actors,
perceptions of the legitimacy of land use initiatives, and the distribution of any associated
benefits (see CIFOR, 2015 for the interview guides).
Interview notes and selected transcripts were coded using QSR’s Nvivo qualitative
research software. Case study and regional summaries were also produced, and the central
findings were synthesized in national publications (full reports available: Kowler et al., 2016;
Myers et al., 2016; Trench et al., 2018).
Results
Deforestation by exclusion: How extractive interests win
Our study sites covered a range of deforestation drivers. While small-scale subsistence agri-
culture has long been blamed for tropical deforestation, evidence suggests that larger scale
agriculture, mining, and other activities with stronger links to global markets are more
important (Lambin et al., 2001; Rudel et al., 2009). Across countries, diverse actors were
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directly responsible for deforestation and degradation. These included: highly capitalized oil
palm companies in Indonesia; small-scale gold miners, farmers engaged in agricultural
intensification, and oil palm companies in Peru; and mechanized agriculture and large-
scale ranching in Mexico. The sites selected for this study aimed to capture these regionally
important dynamics.
Indonesia
Oil palm is seen by many as a pathway to development and improved rural livelihoods
(Casson, 2002; Obidzinski et al., 2012; Rist et al., 2010; Sirait, 2009), but concerns have been
raised about the social, environmental, and justice implications. Despite these concerns, our
research explored why investments continue.
In three of the four oil palm cases that we studied in Indonesia, local people viewed the
companies unfavorably (PT GAL, PT CK1, and Landau Leban2), and favorably only in one
(PT PAS). Local people in Landau Leban felt deceived by the oil palm company because it
did not deliver promised benefits like schools, health services, and higher wages. People
reported losing their lands outright to PT GAL, who either signed deals with their leaders
without their consent or simply occupied their lands and began plantation activities, despite
laws requiring prior consultation (Sanders, unpublished data). Meanwhile, according to
government and nongovernment officials, PT PAS went out of its way to consult local
people, guarantee living wages, and even develop a conservation area within the concession.
What explains these differences?
In the three more conflictive cases, officials from districts and subdistricts, community
representatives, and NGOs reported that the national government supported oil palm, with
policies allowing private ownership and forest conversion with limited social protections. By
contrast, respondents from the national government said the district governments were
responsible for forest conversion because district heads approve concessions and plantation
licenses. In all four cases, the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) classified the lands as “non-forest”
at some point prior to the establishment of the plantations, thus opening them to up for oil
palm development. According to representatives of NGOs, the MoF is subject to strong
pressure from other national government agencies to promote oil palm, while oil palm
companies work directly to secure concessions through well-disposed district heads.
Finally, community leaders must sign off on the Environmental Impact Assessments
(AMDALs) in order to permit oil palm activity.
Despite complaints from NGOs and even government offices—especially the provincial
government—that lack of coordination between different actors was the main obstacle to
slowing oil palm proliferation, interviews revealed a substantial network of coordination
and collaboration across levels and sectors. District governments, provincial government
(which approves a land use plan consistent with concessions), national ministries, the private
sector, and even community leaders all worked collaboratively to establish oil palm planta-
tions. There could hardly be a clearer example of highly effective multilevel and multi-sector
coordination. Nevertheless, this particular brand of coordination did not lead to environ-
mentally sustainable or socially just outcomes.
While actors with a stake in oil palm worked collaboratively, they also worked against
other coalitions in an adversarial fashion. Members of these other coalitions did not have a
seat at the decision-making table and lacked meaningful avenues to participate in gover-
nance. Subdistrict officials across the three contested oil palm cases reported that they were
never consulted by district officials despite being closer to local people and potentially in the
best position to represent them. Likewise, environmental NGOs with close relationships to
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local communities did not have the power to affect outcomes. In these cases, local people
were also largely excluded from decision making, with leaders sometimes signing agreements
without their constituents’ consent, as reported in the case of PT GAL (Sanders, unpub-
lished data).
In summary, local people and their environmental allies reported feeling disenfranchised,
marginalized, deceived, or even robbed by oil palm firms, and the adversarial nature of their
respective coalitions precluded collaboration. The oil palm coalitions were successful in
finding government allies that were likely to support them, and achieved their objectives
to the exclusion of opposing coalitions.
Peru
In Peru, two oil palm cases reveal processes comparable to Indonesia, showing how firms
and government offices work together, despite facing different legal particularities. Because
oil palm is legally treated like any other crop in Peru, lands that are formally classified as apt
for agriculture, whether or not they contain forest cover, are eligible for private ownership
by oil palm companies. Government agricultural offices at multiple levels sold lands to oil
palm companies directly (as in Ucayali) or reclassified lands to open them up for private sale
(as in San Martin), enabling the establishment and expansion of plantations along with
attendant deforestation. In these cases, private firms with an interest in oil palm drove land
use change with the support of certain government offices. In both Peruvian oil palm cases,
as in Indonesia, we found strong evidence that coalitions for oil palm engaged in forum
shopping, did not seek win–win solutions, and worked to exclude others from decision-
making processes.
Local respondents who opposed oil palm in San Martin believe that the firm influenced
the Ministry of Agriculture’s decision to reclassify the land, while the regional government
was unable to influence the outcome despite supporting the local resistance. Conversely, in
Ucayali, a pro-oil palm regional directorate of agriculture was able to sell land to the oil
palm company directly without any external oversight. They also facilitated oil palm expan-
sion by delaying land use permits for smallholders who actively farmed land, instead trans-
ferring land use rights to representatives of the oil palm company (Kowler et al. 2016).
In both regions, local people living in or around the lands that the oil palm companies
sought to exploit had little say in the decision process. Some households in the Ucayali case
willingly joined the plantations, motivated by promises of high profit margins and economic
advancement, whereas activists and villagers who opposed oil palm argued that the amount
of debt that such households took on was impossible to repay (see also Bennett et al., 2018).
Subsequent interviews with local people suggested that their expectations of profit were
unrealistic, and that the technical assistance they received from agricultural extension work-
ers and the firm was woefully inadequate.
In both Peruvian cases, government environmental offices were not involved, as agricul-
tural offices were legally empowered to promote oil palm without coordinating with other
agencies. In this sense, there was indeed a “lack of coordination” between sectors and levels,
as expressed by respondents from the Regional Environmental Authorities of both regions.
However, the fact that the National Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and the regional
directorate of agriculture in Ucayali were so empowered to promote oil palm in coordina-
tion with a firm over the objections of local people has two important implications.
First, the laws had been set down in such a way as to impede meaningful environmental
regulation of oil palm—a fact that was well understood by respondents from government
environment agencies and NGOs. Second, there is no reason to suppose that setting
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up a multi-sector committee with environment and agriculture sector involvement would
have meaningfully altered outcomes in either case.
Rather, actors from the agriculture sector had considerable legal leverage to promote oil
palm, and they used it. Even though legal challenges were raised in both cases, on environ-
mental grounds in Ucayali and over procedural malpractice in San Martin, the decisions in
favor of the oil palm companies ultimately stood. Peruvian land laws all but ensured that
environmental interests would not influence the outcomes, and, as in Indonesia, safeguards
for local people were easily circumvented. There were few safeguards in Peru, as local people
lacked secure land tenure, and there is no Peruvian legislation comparable to Indonesia’s
inti-plasma that requires oil palm firms to share land and revenues.
Mining and other agricultural expansion also drive deforestation in Peru. In Madre de
Dios, mining is managed by the state offices of energy and mines along with artisanal miners
themselves who make decisions that affect land use. While other actors, such as environ-
mental offices and NGOs, have sought to conserve forests and slow the spread of mining,
they have struggled to gain traction. In addition, the national government has intervened to
destroy illegal mining equipment, spurring miners to organize and protest to demand formal
recognition while leading the people of Madre de Dios to elect a pro-mining governor
in 2014.
With the politics of the region shifting to a pro-mining and specifically pro-formalization
posture, actors with an interest in gold mining seem to be winning. In this case, again, local
respondents—including environment sector actors and individuals associated with the
mining federation—reported insufficient coordination between the mining and environment
sectors, and also between the national and regional governments. There was ample evidence
that lack of coordination in a rather strict sense was problematic: different government
agencies’ failure to share information, including land use maps, led to extensive areas
with overlapping and conflicting land rights. However, interviews with environment and
mining sector actors reveal mutually incompatible visions and positions on the future of
land use in the region, and suggest that mining agencies could best advance their extractive
agenda by withholding information from pro-conservation actors (see also Rodriguez-Ward
et al., 2018).
Across these Peruvian cases, collaborative coalitions were rare. Respondents from
Peruvian regional governments were acutely aware of this. An employee of the regional
environmental authority of Madre de Dios explained, “native communities, farmers, brazil-
nut collectors, loggers and miners all have land conflicts with one another due to the over-
lapping of concession rights,” suggesting that coordination failures lead to conflict and,
ultimately, deforestation. Undergirding these conflicts, though, are fundamentally divergent
land use objectives. The mining sector, for example, has no interest in ceding concessions to
conservation, nor does the conservation sector plan to open up ecologically sensitive lands
for extraction. While mining interests have been broadly successful in Madre de Dios, now
through control of the regional government, oil palm coalitions have managed to secure
victories through aggressive forum shopping at both the national and regional levels in the
other regions, to the exclusion of environmental and local peoples’ rights coalitions. All of
these suggest an adversarial relationship between coalitions, where coordination has been
actively blocked by more powerful actors.
Mexico
In the two sites of increasing emissions in Mexico’s Chiapas state—Mapastepec and
Beneme´rito de Las Ame´ricas—there was broad consensus among national and local
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government officials, ejido members,3 and representatives of local producer organizations
that government programs and market forces favoring cattle ranching have driven defores-
tation over the last 40 years. In the last decade, however, the state government, in collab-
oration with private palm oil processing companies, has promoted oil palm plantations
among ejidos and private landowners. In these cases, private companies and government
agricultural offices are in direct contact with local communities; other government agencies
and NGOs that offer alternative development options are absent. Coordination, according
to many respondents, was sorely lacking. As one federal environment sector employ-
ee explained:
The Protected Areas Commission is interested in the protected areas, the Forestry Commission
is interested in the forest, and the Water Commission is interested in water. We all share the
same space, and invest large sums of money, but we don’t coordinate our efforts. Each institu-
tion sees what it wants to see.
These ostensible “coordination failures” contrast with the outright absence of the State in
some study sites. The Mexican forest authority (CONAFOR) has left areas like Mapastepec
outside of its restoration and conservation programs, and private agricultural firms have
replaced the state agricultural sector in providing credit and technical assistance. The result
in these two cases, as well as in the Tekax case in the state of Yucatan, has been cash crop
expansion in the context of volatile global markets. A member of an oil palm association in
Beneme´rito explained that local oil palm producers struggle to negotiate viable prices with
the buyers, who are limited in number. The result is high levels of debt in the association.
Without meaningful support for production or marketing from agricultural offices, or alter-
native activities from environmental or forestry offices, local people are vulnerable. As one
ejido member put it, “the State has abandoned us.”
As in other study countries, respondents from government and civil society organizations
in Mexico insisted that lack of coordination between the forestry, environmental, and agri-
cultural sectors was pervasive and problematic. Indeed, examining the actors involved in the
study cases did reveal that different sectors were active in different regions—a sort of de
facto carving out of areas of influence—perhaps to an even greater degree than in Peru and
in Indonesia. Interviews with state and national environmental offices revealed that their
activities (discussed further in the following section) were limited to particular ejidos with
histories of working with them, usually within or adjacent to protected areas. Meanwhile,
private agricultural firms are legally and practically free to negotiate with smallholders and
ejidos. In a context of ever decreasing state support for smallholder agriculture, there was
little room for farmers approached by these agricultural firms to seek other alternatives,
despite the consequences in terms of increased environmental and socioeconomic
vulnerability.
Nevertheless, ejido members were never categorically excluded from decision processes,
and at least ostensible approval from ejidos was required for any activity that might
affect common-use forest. Thus, there was some communication between coalitions
for agriculture and ranching and ejido members, regardless of whether or not ejidos
had viable alternatives. The coalitions for agricultural intensification and ranching were,
therefore, collaborative to the degree that they engaged with and negotiated with
local people, even if the terms of negotiation were not at all equal. Meanwhile, environ-
mental coalitions could not easily access these spaces, as the agricultural sector dominated
relationships with these communities. The under-minister of forestry from the state
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government of Chiapas aptly characterized the limitations of inter-sectoral coordination in
the state:
No, the agricultural sector doesn’t attend our meetings; in that sense, we don’t ‘coordinate’ with
them—but look: even if we were to move forestry, environment, and agriculture into the same
big-tent office, the fundamental tension between protecting the environment, creating jobs, and
producing food would not simply vanish!
Successful contestations by environmental and local people’s coalitions
Indonesia
In the regions studied in Indonesia, integrated conservation and development programs,
including REDDþ projects, and protected areas exist alongside oil palm plantations.
Partnerships involving Indonesian government agencies such as the MoF,4 foreign govern-
ments, and NGOs dominate this space in Central and West Kalimantan. In Central
Kalimantan, by the 1990s, the Suharto regime’s policies had caused environmental devas-
tation. Environmental and indigenous peoples’ groups had organized over time to secure
support to restore the land and support local peoples’ livelihoods (Myers et al., 2016).
International support from Australia alongside local organization led to the Kalimantan
Forest Carbon Partnership initiative (Sanders et al., 2017). Despite this organized action, oil
palm continued to proliferate in and around the project area. In other words, political will to
halt deforestation was limited, but international pressure and growing popular opposition to
the oil palm enabled coalitions for conservation to advance their agendas to some degree.
In some other cases in Indonesia, such as the community and village forest cases that we
studied, NGOs and communities worked together to suggest alternatives to oil palm. Both
village and community forest cases involved villagers taking advantage of opportunities
provided by NGOs to gain formal management rights when faced with the threat of
encroaching oil palm. In these cases, the presence of NGOs was critical, as was a particularly
motivated district head who was willing to oppose oil palm proliferation—a rarity among
Kalimantan district heads at the time that this research was conducted. In order to secure
these lands for long-term local use, the district head refused to authorize further oil palm
plantations near the communities while NGOs worked with local people to map their lands
and carry out other procedures to establish village and community forests, legal designa-
tions that confer use and management rights to local people. In the same district, Ketapang,
the district head worked with one oil palm company—PT PAS—to discuss sustainable
production options and aggressive profit-sharing and job-creating activities with communi-
ties, including extensive workshops and outreach that, according to community members,
clearly explained the costs, benefits, and risks of the initiative. In this way, individual
champions in key positions were able to contest the dominant development paradigm of
ever-expanding oil palm, and successfully push sustainable land use options.
Crucially, though, these champions did not come to power at random; rather, they were
elected by supportive political coalitions. In the case of Ketapang, indigenous people, locals
concerned with environmental issues, and those who wanted a larger share of oil palm
profits to benefit the district rather than private firms won political power at the ballot
box. Through electoral politics, constituents imposed costs on leaders who failed to deliver
material and environmental benefits to them, and demanded that local leaders advocate for
sustainability and indigenous peoples’ power.
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In the case of a national park in West Kalimantan (see Myers and Muhajir, 2015), an
NGO and the MoF supported the establishment and expansion of the park. However,
failure to consult with local people about conservation objectives, and especially to integrate
local objectives related to land tenure security into conservation strategies, has compromised
the legitimacy and potential effectiveness of the initiative. Here, we see that how the national
government classifies lands impacts who is actually able to exert influence, constraining
political contestation. While the law required some degree of “collaboration” between the
national park and local communities, the principal requirement was a signed agreement
from local leaders, which was not tantamount to broad, meaningful consent in the eyes of
most local people interviewed. The result was a somewhat tense relationship between the
coalitions for local peoples’ rights, which included on the one hand the local communities
themselves and their NGO allies, and the conservation coalition on the other hand, which
included the MoF and the environmental NGO involved in the park. This relationship was
not entirely adversarial, though. The environmental NGO and the MoF did offer monetary
compensation to the local communities for lost access to land. However, local people
rejected this offer, fearing that it would legitimize the park’s existence—in fact, they
wanted complete recognition of their land rights by the state. Thus, while some actors
made overtures toward collaboration, fundamentally incompatible objectives precluded it,
leading instead to an adversarial dynamic. This conflict continues, and local people
may or may not succeed in securing their objectives as they contest them through this
adversarial process.
Peru
Peruvian conservation initiatives were shaped by historical contestations that have deter-
mined where environmental actors can operate, and where they cannot. Several of our study
cases, and many more cases in Peru beyond the scope of this study, involve NGOs working
with small communities to promote sustainable land use activities near protected areas
(McShane et al., 2011; Shanee et al., 2014). Protected areas are managed by an agency of
the Ministry of Environment and were created through political negotiations in the past
(Larsen, 2015; Larson et al., 2016; Monterroso et al., 2017). Many NGOs working in Peru
target indigenous communities with collective titles, or who are seeking such titles, for
integrated conservation and development projects. Classifying lands as protected, or titling
indigenous communities, provides a point of entry for environmental interests, and accord-
ing to respondents from environmental offices and NGOs in Peru, most projects—including
REDDþ initiatives—take place in such areas for these reasons. These cases were charac-
terized by collaborative relationships among actors, with local communities, regional gov-
ernments, the National Protected Areas Service, and NGOs working together to implement
projects. While communicating the benefits associated with conservation initiatives to local
people has been a persistent challenge for these initiatives, we did not find evidence of
strictly adversarial relationships between actors, nor of any ongoing aggressive forum shop-
ping or efforts to exclude particular actors from decision making. On the other hand, con-
servation activities do not necessarily exclude extractive industries from exploiting local
resources and deforestation.
At the time of the research, the regional governments of Ucayali and Madre de Dios
generally supported oil palm, agricultural intensification, and, in the latter, gold mining as
development strategies. In this context, according to respondents from the regions, involv-
ing the regional governments in conservation, REDDþ, and low-emissions development
initiatives was difficult.
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The Peruvian region of San Martin offers a notable contrast, in that its regional govern-
ment had placed conservation and reducing deforestation close to the core of its broader
development agenda. According to respondents from the regional government, the regional
president was elected on a platform of conservation, and saw funding from international
environmental agencies as a pathway to regional prosperity. As a result, San Martin was
aggressive in consolidating a regional environmental authority, advancing policies to
monitor deforestation, and deploying territorial planning in the service of avoiding defor-
estation. In San Martin, the principal contest was therefore electoral, and electoral politics
played a central role in shaping the region’s land use policy agenda. Coalitions for agro-
forestry and coffee, which has been a major economic engine in the region, saw their activ-
ities as potentially compatible with conservation, which brought economic development and
low-emissions development interests together in the region. Such initiatives included local
governments, and also private sector actors that aimed to leverage policies that provided
incentives for ecosystem services, including carbon sequestration, to support maintaining
standing forests. According to proponents of these initiatives, the regional government’s
support for low-emissions development enabled their activities.
The implication is that political coalitions for conservation, including agroforestry, pro-
duced awidemandate for conservation activities that were also compatible with local peoples’
livelihoods and well-being. As one coffee farmer involved in the local government-led initia-
tive that pays local people a small monetary compensation for planting trees to conserve a key
watershed put it, “this project is our retirement.” This coalition was therefore collaborative,
with efforts to bring virtually all stakeholders involved in coffee, from urban dwellers who
depend on forests for their water supply to coffee producers and conservationists into the
same political coalition. There was limited evidence of explicit efforts to exclude any major
actors from participation in this decision process, although, implicitly, the initiative stopped
large firms or landowners from consolidating land for unsustainable production.
Mexico
Mexican initiatives for low-emissions development—largely under the framework of
REDDþ—were led by both NGOs and government agencies, particularly the National
Forestry Commission (CONAFOR). Many such initiatives were implemented around
protected areas where environmental agencies had held influence for decades, after pushing
to establish these areas through political negotiations. In these areas, such as the Sierra
Madre in Chiapas state, NGOs worked with communities to develop sustainable coffee
agroforestry projects, or fulfill prerequisites for participation in payments for environmental
services programs. Elsewhere, as in Maravilla Tenejapa in Chiapas and El Puuc Biocultural
Reserve in Yucata´n state, CONAFOR invested its own resources (sometimes through
matching funds schemes) to deliver payments for environmental services to ejidos, who
had to bid competitively to participate in the program. In these cases, according to local
respondents, agricultural offices were uninvolved. In both Yucatan and Chiapas states,
NGOs and state forestry and environment offices have convened multi-stakeholder plat-
forms, such as REDDþ Technical Consultative Committees, to organize and plan REDDþ
and influence other land use policies, although the agricultural sector has hardly participat-
ed in these spaces. While environment sector actors perceived the agricultural sector’s
absence as a problem, it was not clear what value the sector’s participation would bring.
Meanwhile, private entities have bought up lands for conservation in Yucatan state, and
NGOs have worked independently to advance conservation programs within and near
protected areas with local people. This suggests that integrated conservation and
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development initiatives, including those linked to REDDþ, have advanced even in the
absence of extensive multi-sector coordination. While some respondents argued that explicit
coordination with the agricultural sector might improve and scale up these activities, our
evidence from sites where deforestation is ongoing and the agricultural sector is active do
not make this obvious. Interviews with personnel from NGOs, agricultural and forestry
offices at the federal state levels, and farmers who have worked with agricultural offices all
suggest that the goals of the agriculture sector are largely inconsistent with forest conser-
vation, REDDþ, and low-emissions development. Thus, it is not clear that “coordination”
between these interested actors with divergent interests would resolve underlying issues.
Rather, the greatest wins for coalitions favoring conservation were secured by establishing
biosphere reserves in the past, and working with communities outside the reach of big
agricultural interests—including, potentially, the state’s own agricultural offices. However,
there was little evidence of explicitly adversarial politics in these spaces, and no signs of
deliberate efforts by some actors to forum shop to exclude others from participating.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper set out to contribute to the IG debate by questioning the dominant assumption
that environmental and social aims will be better achieved through more coordination
across land use sectors and levels of governance. Our research shows that enhanced coor-
dination does not necessarily improve governance relationships between actors from sectors,
or yield better environmental and social outcomes. The relationship between the environ-
mental sector and other sectors is highly political, as advocates for conservation and local
people’s rights often have fundamentally different views on, and interests in, development
versus conservation. Such divergent interests cannot be reconciled by mere coordination.
So why do actors sometimes collaborate to achieve certain land use objectives, and why
do more oppositional relationships emerge at other times? Predictably, collaborative gov-
ernance was less likely to emerge in situations where actors’ interests were fundamentally
incompatible. Where deforestation was carried out by private companies, such as for oil
palm, collaboration with environmental coalitions was severely limited, as firms often
worked strategically with government agencies and leaders who shared their ideas and
goals. The extent to which such actors collaborated with local people or worked to exclude
them depended on the particulars of land tenure law, politics, and enforcement. For exam-
ple, in Mexico, private companies often had to work with communities to operate at all
because of the existing tenure structure, while Indonesian firms sometimes found ways to
avoid working with local people altogether.
Rather, these initiatives that caused deforestation required considerable collaboration
among different sectors, such as forestry, environment, and agricultural government offices
in Indonesia, and across levels, involving national and local governments. Nevertheless, in
these cases, coordination did not always lead to environmentally sustainable and socially
just outcomes. Thus, our results suggest that “lack of coordination” among sectors per se is
not the underlying driver of ongoing deforestation and forest degradation, or for unjust
social outcomes, nor is collaboration by itself a solution.
Across our cases, there is strong evidence of divergent interests, which makes mere coor-
dination between sectors and levels an unpromising solution to persistent land use gover-
nance problems. These divergent interests serve to promote the coordination of some actors
at the expense of others. There are some coalitions of actors who genuinely seek to convert
forests to other uses, and who find allies in government offices with a legal mandate
to facilitate these ends. Conversely, coalitions that favor conservation can also find allies
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in government who advance their interests, although this is less common as laws and
institutions were often created to prioritize economic development and over indigenous
rights, environmental conservation, and equity.
Broadly, our results extend the literature on advocacy coalitions to show how state and
non-state actors work together or oppose each other to achieve their goals. Our results
extend and expand on Rudel’s seminal work on growth coalitions in an important sense:
Rudel does not distinguish as sharply as we do between sectors of national and subnational
governments. It is not just the case that policy limits the influence of growth coalitions;
rather, the government itself has some elements within it that are part of growth coalitions,
and others that oppose those coalitions. Our evidence suggests that it is not only important
to understand the politics of traditional growth coalitions, including the dynamics of capital
versus labor, but the ways that different agencies within the government itself support these
different groups. In fact, finding strong supporters of sustainable alternatives within gov-
ernment sectors that traditionally drive deforestation and degradation may be an essential
pathway toward sustainable solutions.
Deforestation and forest degradation, and their attendant consequences for social and
economic justice, are fundamentally political problems. The solutions to such political issues
are themselves political, requiring sustained pressure to change laws, such as to protect
forests or indigenous rights, in addition to forming coalitions that can jointly take advan-
tage of existing laws and institutions to advance environmentally and socially desir-
able agendas.
Overall, we found evidence of poor coordination among sectors and levels of government
in a strict sense. Peruvian mining, agriculture, and environmental agencies did not always
share land use maps among their offices, nor did national and regional governments nec-
essarily share spatial data. This created overlapping concession information in some areas.
Indonesian maps were also often contradictory. And in both Mexico and Peru, agriculture
sector actors rarely participated in multi-stakeholder meetings to coordinate activities relat-
ed to REDDþ. Nevertheless, we argue that our cross-case and cross-country data regarding
how land use decisions are made suggests coordination is ever present in land use change
and is in fact often essential for driving deforestation. Lack of coordination among specific
agencies is, more often than not, a symptom of political conflicts, and not an underlying
factor that somehow compromises good governance.
Policy makers at all levels would do well to recognize these political realities. Persistent
discourses at multiple levels emphasize the need for greater coordination among agriculture,
environment, and mining sectors, for example. But analyzing the decision-making process
across multiple levels, and examining which coalitions of actors ultimately succeed in secur-
ing their objectives, reveals two key realities that decision-makers, civil society, and
researchers should take seriously.
First, the objectives of actors from different sectors differ, at times irreconcilably. That
their objectives diverge so sharply should give us pause when presuming that better
“coordination”—that is, communication, negotiation, and information sharing—will
solve governance problems. Second, where low-emissions development initiatives have
taken root, and activities that empower local people and also reduce deforestation and
forest degradation have been successful, a history of political negotiations and contestations
by coalitions of NGOs, government environmental offices, and local people have enabled
them to do so. In other words, political organizing, generally from the ground up but
sometimes with the support of international actors including donors, was by far the most
successful pathway to successful low-emissions development initiatives among our extensive
case studies.
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This does not imply that coordination and information sharing are undesirable. On the
contrary, all else equal, it might be essential, and one might expect it to enable coalitions for
low-emissions development and local peoples’ rights to take advantage of better information
to organize more effectively. We find that broader coordination among a wider range of
actors promotes a higher degree of perceived legitimacy. This higher level of coordination
includes the space for dissenting viewpoints to be heard. Ultimately, funding and initiatives
that aim to seriously alter the global trajectory of land use change, reduce deforestation, and
empower local people must engage strategically with political organizations and enable
political contestations by these groups.
Finally, there are risks associated with an emphasis on better coordination, which include
failure to recognize which actors are most responsible for environmental degradation and
the ongoing marginalization of local people. To cast agricultural intensification advocates
who extend irresponsible loans to smallholders, or even abusive oil palm companies that
seek to grab land by any means available, as potential allies for environmental interests or
smallholders is to misunderstand the political reality. In fact, such actors ought to be the
targets of regulation, and their activities the object of organized political contestation. As
“landscape approaches” and support for multi-sector coordination gain traction at multiple
levels, donors may de-prioritize political organizing and lobbying for change, and instead
invest in multi-stakeholder platforms; and there is mixed evidence concerning the role of
multi-stakeholder platforms in generating sustainable change, as discussed in the litera-
ture review.
Despite the limitations of intervention focused simply on improving coordination,
environmental organizations did succeed in improving land tenure security for local
people, bolstering protected area management, fighting land grabs, and slowing extracti-
vism. These successes were predicated on strategies for political contestation, taking advan-
tage of existing laws to advance an environmentally sustainable and socially equitable
agenda. Other types of political organizing are necessary to lobby to change laws and
strengthen coordination among members of potential coalitions. Convening roundtables
and holding participatory workshops to clarify shared visions and goals among actors,
for example, constitute political organizing and coordination. To be successful, though,
our results suggest that these types of activities must recognize who has interests that are
diametrically opposed to coalitions for social and environmental justice, and organize
accordingly.
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Notes
1. The research also included Tanzania and Vietnam, but we have prioritized the other three countries
due to the availability of data and limited space.
2. The terms used here are abbreviations for the companies and case studies. See Myers et al. (2016)
for further information. PT CK1 refers to a company in Central Kalimantan that permitted
research on condition of anonymity.
3. Ejidos, along with agrarian communities, are forms of collective land holdings that still account for
around half of Mexico’s land area.
4. Since the time that this research was conducted, the MoF and the Ministry of Environment have
merged into the singular Ministry of Environment and Forestry.
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